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Administrative Law-Judicial Review Under West Virginia
Administrative Procedure Act Not Applicable to Agency
Actions Relating Solely to Internal Management
Disciplinary action was instituted against a member of the
Department of Public Safety resulting in his demotion and transfer
to another post within the state. There was a full hearing and
all prescribed procedures were followed. When the adversely
affected member appealed to the circuit court, the State Depart-
ment of Public Safety petitioned the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the circuit court
from proceeding. Held, writ granted. The West Virginia Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act' does not apply to actions taken by
1 W. VA. CODE, ch. 29A (Michie Supp. 1964). See generally Harrison,
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an agency which relate solely to its internal control and manage-
ment. In addition, all of the administrative remedies which were
available had not been exhausted. State ex rel. Burchett v. Taylor,
149 S.E.2d 234 (W. Va. 1966).
The principal case is of particular interest since it is the first
judicial interpretation of the application of the West Virginia
Administrative Procedure Act enacted in 1964. One of the principal
issues is the relationship of due process of law and the review-
ability of administrative decisions.
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act was promulgated
by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws in 1944. Since its promulgation, various states, including
West Virginia, have adopted acts patterned after it.2 The purpose
of these acts is to establish a uniform method of administrative
adjudication by all agencies, to provide notice and an opportunity
to be heard and present evidence before such agencies and to
establish a uniform method of court review of all administrative
adjudications.'
Prior to the adoption of the act a direct judicial review of an
administrative decision was available only if specifically provided
by statute.' In the absence of statutory review the use of common
law writs such as certiorari, mandamus and prohibition was neces-
sary for review. Occasionally, extraordinary writs such as quo war-
ranto,5 habeas corpus6 or writ of procendendo' would be employed.
Certiorari is the discretionary remedy which is used when no
specific provision for appeal is provided. It is confined to judicial
and quasi-judicial acts and also to the records which are before
2 DAws, A MMSrMATVE LAW 11 (1965).
SIND. STAT. ANN. ch. 30, § 63-3001 (1962). The West Virginia Code
does not set forth the purposes for which the West Virginia Administrative
Procedure Act was adopted, so a comparison is made here to the similar
Administrative Procedure Act of another state which does set forth its
purposes.
4 People ex rel. Chillicothe Township v. Board of Review, 19 Ill.2d 424,
167 N.E.2d 553 (1960).
' Petition of O'Leary, 325 Mass. 179, 89 N.E.2d 769 (1950).
6 State ex rel. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Brown, 165 Ohio St. 521,
138 N.E.2d 248 (1956).
( State ex rel. Baer v. City of Beckley, 133 W. Va. 459, 57 S.E.2d 263(1949).
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the agency.' Prohibition is used to control actions of a judicial or
quasi-judicial nature when the body in so acting has usurped its
power, is without jurisdiction to take such action or, having
jurisdiction, exceeds its legitimate power.' Mandamus is used to
require a body to act or to control actions of officers in an agency
in exercising their discretion, but only in the presence of caprice,
passion, partiality, fraud, arbitrary conduct, some ulterior motive
or misapprehension of law upon their part. 0
The West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act now provides
that a review is obtainable by filing a petition with either the
circuit court of Kanawha County or of the county in which the
petitioner resides." However, the act expressly preserves the
other means of review."2 Thus it appears that West Virginia has
ignored the admonition of a recognized authority on administrative
law who has criticized the failure to make a petition the only
form of procedure for obtaining judicial review of administrative
action regardless of the reasons involved. "Mere establishment of
the petition for review, without abolition of the extraordinary
remedies [certiorari, prohibition and mandamus] as a means of
review, will not suffice. We know that where that solution has been
tried the extraordinary remedies have continued to cause un-
necessary litigation."'
The right to review under the West Virginia Act is provided
in the following language: "Any party adversely affected by a
final order or decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial
review thereof under this chapter . . . .-,4 However, this right
is limited by the act's definitions of "contested case," "agency" and
grul. 5
The Act defines a "contested case" as: "a proceeding before
an agency in which the legal rights, duties, interests or
privileges of specific parties are required by law or con-
8 United States Steel Corp. v. Stokes, 138 W. Va. 506, 76 S.E.2d 474
(1953).9 Village of Bridgeport, Ohio v. Public Serv. Comnn'n, 125 W. Va. 342,
24 S.E.2d 285 (1943).
'0 Carer v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
"W. VA. CODE ch. 29A, art. 5, § 4(b )(Michie Supp. 1965).
W. VA. CODE ch. 29A, art 5, § 4 a Michie Supp. 1965).
"Davis, Forms of Proceedings for judicial Review of Administrative
Action, 44 ILL. L. Rlv. 565, 629 (1949-1950).
' 4 W. VA. CODE ch. 29A, art. 5, § 4(a) (Michie Supp. 1965).
15 W. VA. CODE chi. 29A, art. 1, 1 (Michie Supp. 1965).
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stitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing,
but shall not include cases in which an agency issues a
license ... and shall not include rule making"
From this definition it appears that a statutory provision or
requirement imposed by the West Virginia Constitution, involving
a right, duty, interest or privilege, as interpreted by the courts,
must be involved before a judicial hearing is permitted.' 6
The court in the principal case noted that there were no con-
stitutional or statutory provisions giving a member of the depart-
ment of safety any tenure of office or position. Therefore, since
no duty, right or interest was involved, a "contested case" was
not involved and no right existed for a direct judicial review.
A Michigan case, Sherwin v. Mackie,'" held that a dispute
between realty owners and the State Highway Commission, con-
cerning the prohibition of parking on a highway abutting their
property, was not a "contested case" as defined in the Michigan
statute.'8 "The order of the defendants here in question affected
all members of the public using the trunkline in question ....
It [the agency hearing] was not a proceeding to determine rights
or privileges of a specific party or parties."' 9
The definition of "agency" in the West Virginia act requires
that the department involved be authorized to make rules or
adjudicate contested cases. This requirement points out how the
definitions of rules and contested cases are closely related to
the definition of agency and, therefore, must be met before a
department can be an "agency" within the contemplation of the
act.
The definition of "rule includes "every regulation, standard,
or statement of policy or interpretation of general application
and future effect, including the amendment or repeal thereof,
affecting private rights, privileges or interests ...but does not
include regulations relating solely to the internal management of
the agency. .. "-o Noting the specific exclusion of "regulations
6 1 CooPER, STATE Ainn.sTRAwrvE LAW 273 (1985).
' 364 Mich. 188, 111 N.W.2d 56 (1961).
'8 Mica. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(21.1) (1961).
,9 Sherwin v. Mackie, 364 Mich. 188, 195, 111 N.W.2d 56, 60 (1961).
, oBefore adopting this Act, West Virginia used the same definition for
"rule" in the statute which required the filing of rules by state agencies,
W. VA. CoDE ch. 5, art. 2, § 3 (Michie 1961).
(Vol. 69
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relating solely to the internal management of the agency", it is
apparent that the principal case did not involve a "rule" as defined
by the act and, therefore, the disciplinary measures taken by the
Department of Public Safety were not within the contemplation
of the act.
Several States have adopted similar definitions for "rule" which
specifically exclude regulations concerning the internal manage-
ment of the agency,2' but no cases have been found in these
jurisdictions which have dealt with this specific exclusion. With
a reasonable interpretation of the literal words of these statutes it
seems that these states would be in accord with the West
Virginia court's interpretation.
Judicial review, even if available by the provisions of the Act,
might still be denied by the courts for various reasons. It might
be denied when: (1) statutory provisions have granted exclusive
discretion to the agency,22 (2) statutory provisions have made all
such decisions final, " or (3) the agency has been granted broad
discretionary powers." Of course, whether or not this will occur
depends upon whether a question of due process arises, a constitu-
tional or jurisdictional question or fraud is involved, the decision
was clearly arbitrary or beyond the agency's jurisdiction or other
reviewable irregularities appear."
Courts frequently set up additional requirements for review,
including the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
All forms of appeal which have been made available administra-
tively must have been exercised." The West Virginia court applies
this rule and noted in the principal case that one administrative
remedy had not been exhausted. The reasons for the rule are
basically to utilize the experience and judgment of the agency,
avoid piecemeal appeals and recognize the primacy of the agency
in the field committed to it by the legislature.27 However, like
21 MAnm REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 2301 (1964); MASs. ANN. LAwS ch.
30A, § 1 (1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 264 (1956).
22 Leeman v. Vocelka, 149 Neb. 702, 32 N.W.2d 274 (1948).2 2 Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Bd., 320
U.S. 297 (1943).24 Gillan v. Board of Regents of Normal Schools, 88 Wis. 7, 58 N.W.
1042 (1894).
25 DAwJs, AmnmSTRA=Vn LAW § 28.02 (1951).
2 6 Daurelle v. Traders Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 143 W. Va. 674, 104
S.E.2d 320 (1958).
272 CoopE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 572.
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most rules this one too has its exceptions. The doctrine will be
disregarded if the administrative remedy available is useless,28 the
agency does not have jurisdiction," a question of law controls
the decision,3" a prevailing constitutional question is raised" or
immediate and final relief is necessary to avoid irreparable harm.3
As to the constitutionality of limiting review, i.e., satisfying
due process requirements, the principal case demonstrates that
"'due process of law may be afforded administratively as well as
judicially. Lawful administrative process is due process equally
as much as lawful judicial process.""' This has long been West
Virginia's position. 4 A leading case on the constitutionality of
restricting judicial review is Reetz v. Michigan.5 In that case, as
in the principal case, the United States Supreme Court held that
due process does not require judicial review. The Court observed:
"we know of no provision in the Federal Constitution which
forbids a state from granting to a tribunal, whether called a court
or a board of regulation, the final determination of a legal ques-
tion."3
Davis, in his text on administrative law, seems generally to be
in favor of limiting judicial review. He feels that, unless limited
somewhat, judicial review weakens and destroys the administrative
process by failing to utilize the special competence which the
agencies have in their respective fields. He states that "when an
administrative appeal or review provides a satisfactory check, the
"137practical need for judicial review may largely disappear ....
28 Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
29 State ex rel. Gordon Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. West Virginia State Bd.
of Examiners of Registered Nurses, 136 W. Va. 88, 66 S.E.2d 1 (1951).
'o Deaney v. Linen Thread Co., 19 N.J. 578, 118 A.2d 28 (1955).
31 Long v. City of Highland Park, 329 Mich. 146, 45 N.W.2d 10 (1950).
32 Hesperin Land Development Co. v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App.2d
865, Cal. Rptr. 815 (1960).
" Nutler v. State Road Comm'n, 119 W. Va. 312, 316, 193 S.E. 549,
551 (1937); see State v. Sponaugle, 45 W. Va. 415, 32 S.E. 283 (1898).
34 State v. Sponaugle, supra note 33.
35 188 U.S. 505 (1903).36 Id. at 507. In conjunction with this due process question, although
not raised in the principal case, is that of the right to a trial by jury. Oc-
casionally this question is raised but it poses no problem since these adminis-
trative proceedings are special and summary proceedings created by statute
subsequent to the adoption of the West Virginia Constitution. Therefore, not
being in the nature of a suit at common law, a determination of facts in
such proceedings can be left to the administrative agencies. Bowman v.
Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S.E. 141 (1920).
37 DAvs, op. cit. supra note 24, §28.21, at 519-520.
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The principal case well recognizes that judicial review of the
decisions of administrative agencies is limited, not only by the
definitions contained in the act, but also by policies adopted by
the courts. These limitations on review do not appear to have
created significant problems incident to due process of law re-
quirements. Other issues on judicial review of administrative
action under the West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act
are certain to arise, 8 but the court's decision in the principal case
will serve well to shape the pattern of judicial review in this
jurisdiction.
Paul Robert Rice
Attorney and Client-Acts of Real Estate Broker Constituting
Unauthorized Practice of Law
D, a corporate real estate brokerage firm, was filling in
earnest money contract forms and securing thereto signatures of
buyers and sellers of real property. The D was also using and
preparing form deeds and other instruments necessary to clear or
transfer title. The forms used had been composed by lawyers.
P, the Chicago Bar Association, sought to enjoin the alleged un-
authorized practice of law. The circuit court found the forms
used in the initial contracts were a necessary incident to the real
estate business, but held that the use of forms in the preparation
of deeds and other subsequent instruments constituted an un-
authorized practice of law. The appellate court held that neither
the initial contracts nor the subsequent deeds and related instru-
ments could be filled in by D. Held, appellate court affirmed
in part and reversed in part; circuit court affirmed. A real estate
broker may properly fill in the usual form of earnest money con-
tract or offer to purchase where such involves merely supplying
of factual data, but the drawing or filling in of blanks on deeds,
mortgages and other legal instruments subsequently executed
requires the peculiar skill of an attorney and constitutes the
practice of law. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 214
N.E.2d 771 (Ill. 1966).
The question of what real estate services require the skill
peculiar to one trained and experienced in the law had been
38 Harrison, supra note 1, at 190.
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